Legal Realism Now? by Simon, David
Legal Realism Now?
May 20, 2019
Download a copy of this Response:
David Simon





Legal realists have accomplished quite a bit since Holmes. Some have succeeded in swallowing whole  elds of
law with economic jargon. Others have eaten away at law’s mystical innards by exposing its racism, sexism,
and classism. And still others have evacuated from the legal intestines the digestible bits so savory to the
mouth of the 19th century jurist: the categories. What is left of law in this picture? One answer, for many
realists, is not much. Law is a policy tool, don’t you know? It is designed to do things. And it is the task of
scholars to show how law does things, not to identify “transcendental nonsense.”[2] Surely Felix Cohen has a
point.
But, as Thomas Grey reminds us, even the most tough-minded realist had a love for categorization and
systematization.[3] True, it was with an eye toward how useful the exercise, but not always. Much of Adam
Mossoff’s essay, Trademark as a Property Right,[4] could easily be regarded as engaging in the nonsense legal
realism left behind. This is how Ramsi Woodcock characterizes it in his response, Legal Realism: Un nished
Business.[5] Formalistic, conceptual analysis is, on this view, an analytical black hole. But this is an
exaggeration, a mischaracterization. It is true, as Brian Frye notes, that Mossoff’s essay makes a “valuable
contribution,”[6]even if it is not the kind of contribution of which many are fond. More than that, though,
Woodcock’s response reveals a curious analytic amnesia about the nature of conceptualization and realism.
And it is one that traps realists into a lexical vortex not unlike the one they so eagerly deride.
II.  Realism and Formalism
The realists replaced talk of legal metaphysics with power,[7] and later economics, race, sex, and so on.[8] I
must admit that I regard this development as positive. Replacing formalistic legal internalism—the view that
legal categories have inherent conceptual features, and that legal analysis proceeds by deductive logic—with a
more nuanced understanding of law as an interactive, social process was an important criticism. It enabled us
to better understand law’s effects and how we might change them. And yet in attempting to escape the
autonomous, legal hermeneutics characteristic of formalism, some analytical techniques developed their own
kind of internalism.
Consider the economic analysis of law, where formalistic internalism of a different kind carries on without a
hint of irony. The more one reduces legal issues to the economic lexicon, the more it resembles the formalist
metaphysics it ridicules. Does fair use solve market failures? Does intellectual property law increase e ciency?
Do patents have spillover effects? Should a legal entitlement be protected by a liability rule or a property rule?
Does the legal rule create a positive or negative externality? Or, best of all, does the law increase social welfare?
The task of the scholar answering these questions is to categorize things in the right way, in a way that allows
an economic analysis. But in these cases the economic analysis is legal analysis. And what did the formalists
want to do except legal analysis? If we follow the arguments to their most basic form—and even to their regular
appearances in scholarship—we wind up in the world of abstractions legal realism promised to leave behind.[9]
That’s not to say there aren’t real differences. One of formalism’s rather astounding claims was to offer a
method for “deducing” “right” answers from judicial decisions or statutes. Economic analysis of law, on the
other hand, one-ups formalism by providing not merely answers but also questions. Economic analysts of law
want policy to determine law, and economics to determine policy. When the analyst categorizes legal rules or
doctrine, she does so to understand how to achieve particular policy results—those that maximize (or promote)
e ciency.[10] One ought to be able to determine whether a rule is correct by evaluating whether it achieves the
desired economic result. Right answers here are of the economic, not the formalist, kind.[11] So, too, are the
questions.
I don’t mean to suggest that legal realism is the conceptual equivalent to law and economics; it certainly is not.
I also don’t mean that other features of legal realism fail to surpass legal formalism; they certainly do. But it’s a
mistake to think that conceptual analysis as such is a waste of time because we should concern ourselves only
with policy. Not only does conceptual analysis sometimes yield important insights, it’s also critical to a
functioning legal system. Formalism’s toolkit—analogical reasoning, adherence to precedent, conceptual
analysis, etc.—is not just obscurantist cover for personal judgments, policy, or otherwise. Its machinery also
provides a means for avoiding discussions of policy when it is impractical or imprudent.
Sometimes, maybe even often for trial judges, there is no obvious policy analysis to be had. Much of the trial
judge’s work involves discovery and technical procedure. Legal rules do not always and in every case present
the judge with clear policy choices. To ask them to consider the policy consequences of every decision they
make, to ask them to predict and control future cases and strategy, is a burden too great for even the most
accomplished jurist. And, even where consideration of policy is possible, it may not be desirable. If current
events tell us anything about law, it’s that formalism may be law’s redeeming virtue as well as its mystical vice.
Law can’t and shouldn’t be all politics, power, race or economics, just as it shouldn’t be all internal, conceptual
wheel-spinning. Isn’t this what realism taught? This is why a rather well-known exponent of judicial pragmatism
—one who has swooned over economic analysis of law[12]—suggests that judges might resort to the tools of
formalism to build a legal decision.[13]
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And yet we have grave unease about the self-proclaimed judicial scientist, or, for that matter, the more
contemporary judicial umpire. Our worries stem from insights realism has wrought. And they are real worries.
But if the formalism, so dominant in judicial chambers, cannot give us “right” answers, does it reduce the judge
to a black-robed huckster? Are those well-meaning men and women doing anything other than playing a kind of
conceptual shell game? There is a nuanced answer.[14] In hewing to subtlety, though, we are susceptible to the
failures so meticulously identi ed by the realists: a desire for right answers, and, more importantly, a method
for deriving them.
Perhaps this is why economic analysis of law, more than some of the other realist approaches to law, has
appeal. It is not merely a criticism of law’s conceptual house of cards; it offers a “scienti c” method for deriving
“right” answers that are determined by “facts” in the “real world.” Of course, the economist’s real world is a
 ctional oversimpli cation. And the facts she uncovers are more institutional than brute.[15] At least, though,
economics professes concern for (some) consequences of legal rules. Formalism, it is true, tends to become,
well, overly formalistic. In these circumstances it is easy enough to see the appeal of approaches like those
favored by economists. Does this mean that law and economics—or, for that matter, consequentialism—is
valuable and legal formalism is not? Hardly. Does the realism of the 20th century render “quixotic” the
formalism of Mossoff’s essay? Yes, but not entirely.
Although the methodof legal formalism as an objective arbiter of law is passé, the method itselfis not. If we try
to determine what makes something property and what makes something not-property, have we done
something valuable? Have we done something important by characterizing laws into liability and property
rules?[16] Should we, while we’re at it, waive off Socrates for annoying the gentry with pestering questions
about nature of justice?[17] The answer depends upon why we are categorizing. Economic categories help us
evaluate, within a certain conceptual system, which rules we might want to adopt and why. I doubt many people
think the formalism does the same.
The skepticism about formalism is a direct result of legal realism’s critique. Formalism-as-judicial-science is
dead, and so legal formalism offers no independentreason to adopt its conclusions. But, then again, neither
does economics. Didn’t legal realism’s razor cut judicial science at the knees, whatever its instantiation?
Economics, then, must provide independent reason why we should accept its analysis before we run full boar
into the thicket of e ciency, markets, and elastic demand. A system’s emphasis on consequences is a good
reason to favor it over a system that disregards consequences. We should remember, though, that non-
consequentialist reasoning doesn’t disregard consequences. And neither does formalism. Legal realists, above
all else, have taken pains to point this out.
Then again, consequences are important. And if we claim—as do consequentialists—that consequences areall
that matters, then it’s quite important to understand what count as consequences and how and why they are
measured. A particular passage from Woodcock’s response is relevant:
But what Americans care about is whether protecting brand loyalty is good or bad for consumers. Protecting
brand loyalty might be good for consumers because it allows  rms to reap rewards from investing in the
production of better products. Or protecting brand loyalty might be bad for consumers because it magni es the
power of seductive advertising or the familiarity generated by having been  rst to market to create irrational
brand attachments, leading to higher prices and harm to more-innovative but less-well-known competitors.
Legal realism demands that the debate over trademarks be carried out in these terms, in terms of effects.[18]
Notice the conceptual backsliding. The realist should not assume, as does Woodcock, that the language of
economics determines the measuring of effects. The more pragmatic among us wonder not whether
modi cations to trademark law will increase consumer surplus or promote social welfare (as measured by
economists) but rather what effects does trademark law have on society? Does it silence critics? Does it
threaten to invade every aspect of our lives, to render every experience we have to one determined by
trademark holders (in particular, large corporations)? Most importantly, we want to know if the effects are the
kind we want to encourage? Mossoff’s essay, it is true, does not consider such questions, but neither does
Woodcock’s.
III.  Reality and Effects
An emphasis on effects shouldn’t require us in every circumstance to point out the effects of some conceptual
scheme or another. Or if it does, we should also place similar demands on the kinds of effects we are
interested in, and why. It is natural for Woodcock to assume that a focus on consequences requires a focus on
reality. Consequences presuppose events with effects in the world of sense. For Woodcock, Mossoff’s
conceptual analysis falls outside the scope of reality because it doesn’t concern events in the world of sense—
which Woodcock de nes as the quanti able effects of laws upon economic measures. No wonder he has
di culty  nding in Mossoff’s essay redeeming qualities. Formalism, in Woodcock’s view, is not reality based.
And because formalism is fantasy, it should be discarded. It’s a curious conclusion to reach for someone who
acknowledges the continuing dominance of formalism in legal practice and education.
Yes, of course, but formalism’s pervasiveness is precisely the problem, according to Woodcock. Lawyers and
judges engage in analysis that amounts to verbal smoke and mirrors. Formalism’s reality is unreality. One
cannot divine property rights by consulting sacred texts; one must examine the things as they function in the
real world. I am sympathetic to this line of thought, but one should be careful not to run with it too far. Use in
judicial opinions is use in the real world. The judge understanding the internal development of a concept is an
effect in the real world. This is not an argument that judges or policy makers—or god help us, law professors—
should ignore effects outside the courtroom. Only that effects inside (the head) matter, too.
Sometimes these internal effects are signi cant. Where, for example, formalism provides a compelling account
of law’s doctrines or rules. Explanatory power is not only reason-giving, but reason-making. Realists should take
note because many of realisms offshoots can’t fully explain law.[19] Realism, at least less sophisticated
versions, necessarily leaves out important conceptual features by its criticism of them as window-dressing.
Worse still, it regards central features of law as distractions or, as in the case of morality, hopelessly empty. In
economic analysis of tort law, for example, the idea of corrective justice is nowhere to be found. Yet this
concept animates the principal features of the doctrine.[20] Mossoff’s analysis is in a similar vein: it tries to
account for why, internally, the laws are the way they are. Maybe it doesn’t succeed. But this is something
economic analysis, and much of realist scholarship, cannot do.
Is this reality? It sure feels like it. The problem realists have with this reality is that it tends to obscure the
dynamics of power, privilege, and so on. But so does economic analysis of law. What realism teaches is not
that the economic method will give us the answers that we want, but that the language of economics performs
the same sleight of hand as legal formalism. Ideology infects the terminology and structure of economics—
and, consequently, its application to law—to such a large degree that its most basic and foundational concepts
(e.g., e ciency, markets) are taken as proper starting points for analysis. The realist dares not make any such
assumptions: pressing on these tender spots in the skin of economic analysis reveals the rot that lies
underneath. When the skin breaks and the realist peers inside, she sees that theoretical debates about
terminology and its application have about as much impact on the infection as debating whether trademarks
are property in the formalist picture. The indeterminacy of economic analysis must be confronted along with
the indeterminacy of formalism.
This problem is not limited to economic analysis of law. Even the more general consequentialist picture, one to
which I am somewhat partial, has its own schemata, which, like so many others, can’t help but become all-
encompassing. When one attempts to assemble a consequentialist version of ethics or law, she quickly begins
to make accommodations to non-consequentialist reasoning.[21] To shield consequentialism from the attacks
of deontology, however, consequentialism has an automatic “vacuum cleaner” that can suck-up any non-
consequentialist attacks: any non-consequentialist theory can be “consequentialized.”[22] If this is true, then we
are left with a theory so encompassing and far-reaching it offers no meaningful concrete guidance; indeed,
since the vacuum cleaner can suck up almost any deontological theory (or value), consequentialism itself falls
victim to the kind of charge realists are accustomed to making: it doesn’t capture the reality it deems so
important.
IV. Conclusion
Despite its shortcomings, formal conceptual analysis, just as economic analysis or critical legal studies, does
have value. It tells us about the nature of our conceptual structures, why we rely on them, and whether these
assumptions should be revisited. In short, it is part of the legal realist project, even if its prescriptions may not
be. More than that, though, formalism has an interesting and important reality-based feature: it doesprovide
judges with an internal reason—a reason judges count as signi cant—to accept its conclusions, or at least
consider them seriously. These reasons are not just window-dressing; they can act as real constraints.[23]
Woodcock is too quick to wave off conceptual analysis as irrelevant in the new age of empirically-driven law. At
the same time that Woodcock recognizes that legal disputes are driven by the formal legal analysis, he notes
that legal realism has destroyed this method of decision-making. Maybe law is outgrowing its formalist
britches, but its practitioners still need to wear pants. We might laugh when one tries to determine the
fundamental attributes of property in the same way philosophers now laugh at the quest to identify the essence
of a table. But in the real world, the former impacts people’s lives while the latter makes no difference
whatsoever.[24] Better to be measured about the whole thing than to throw out old clothes before the new ones
have arrived. If Mossoff offends legal realists, then, it may be because they have caught a glimpse in the mirror.
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